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Abstract
We study the role of morality in debt repayment, using an experiment with the credit
card customers of a large Islamic bank in Indonesia. In our main treatment, clients
receive a text message stating that “non-repayment of debts by someone who is able
to repay is an injustice.” This moral appeal decreases delinquency by 4.4 percentage
points from a baseline of 66 percent, and reduces default among customers with the
highest ex-ante credit risk. Additional treatments help benchmark the effects against
direct financial incentives, and rule out competing explanations, such as reminder ef-
fects, priming religion, and provision of new information.
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I. Introduction
The ability to collect debts is one of the main pillars of any financial system. While
economists have extensively examined the importance of screening, monitoring, and rep-
utational considerations, little attention has been paid to the role of morality in establishing
a norm of debt repayment. This is quite surprising, given that throughout history—from an-
cient philosophy to contemporary debates—questions of debt and debt repayment have often
been closely associated with issues of morality. In Plato’s Republic, for example, Socrates
defines the meaning of justice as “telling the truth and repaying one’s debts.”1 More re-
cently, a debate about the morality of defaulting on one’s mortgage or student loan in times
of economic distress has featured prominently in the news media.2 Issues of morality have
also played a role in the context of sovereign debt, for example in debates about defaults
and debt forgiveness in countries such as Argentina or Greece.
In this paper, we study the role of moral considerations in debt repayment, using a field
experiment with the credit card customers of a large bank in Indonesia. Our experiment
is set in the context of Islamic banking, which is a large and rapidly growing industry in
Indonesia and around the world, with currently more than 300 banks in over 75 countries
and approximately US$1.5 trillion in assets (?) offering Sharia-compliant financial products.
While Islamic banks typically offer the same range of consumer financial products that
are also available at conventional banks, they often emphasize the ethical dimension of their
business model, thus providing an environment in which communications with both financial
1There are also numerous references to the morality of debt and debt repayment in religious texts. An
example from the Bible is Romans 13:7-8 : “Give to everyone what you owe them [...] and let no debt
remain outstanding.” An example from Islam is Shahih al-Bukhari 3:575 : “[...] The best among you are
those who repay their debts handsomely.” Many languages, including German and Hebrew, share the same
word for “debt” and “guilt.” Nietzsche offers a detailed account of this association and its influence on the
development of moral norms in The Genealogy of Morals (1887).
2See, for example, Lee Siegel “Why I Defaulted on My Student Loans”, New York Times, June 6, 2015.
“Times Op-Ed Goes All In On Student Debt Silliness”, Forbes, June 8, 2015.
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and moral content are natural.3
We use this setting to conduct a series of experiments in which late-paying credit card
customers receive messages alerting them to the moral consequences of non-repayment. The
design of our experiment takes advantage of the fact that our partner bank had already
introduced a mobile phone text messaging system that sends reminders to customers who
have not made the required minimum payment one day after the due date. Working with
the bank, we developed a set of additional text messages, which included basic reminders,
placebo messages, messages containing a moral appeal, and messages highlighting the credit
reputation consequences of delinquency. These messages were randomly assigned at the
individual customer level and sent to customers who had missed the repayment due date,
and had still made no payment two days before the end of a ten-day grace period granted by
the bank. If no payment is received by the end of this grace period, the customer is considered
delinquent, the credit card is blocked, the account is charged a late payment fee, and the
customer is reported to the Indonesian credit registry, which generally precludes borrowing
from any formal sector lender for at least 24 months—the time period for which the negative
entry remains on record—even if the debt is eventually repaid. The main outcome of interest
in our experiments is therefore the discrete choice between repaying before the end of the
grace period or becoming delinquent.
In the main treatment condition of our experiment, late-paying customers receive a text
message which highlights that not repaying a debt when one is able to repay violates a moral
norm. The message refers to the Islamic doctrine on non-repayment of debts using a quote
from the Shahih-al-Bukhari, one of the main religious texts of Sunni Islam, which serves as
an important source for the interpretation of Islamic law and is widely known and respected
3Not all clients of Islamic banks are motivated by religious considerations. In fact, 10% of credit card
clients at our partner bank are non-Muslims. This is roughly the same as the share of non-Muslims in the
Indonesian population.
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among Indonesian Muslims:4
The Prophet (Peace and blessings be upon Him) says: “non-repayment of debts
by someone who is able to repay is an injustice.” (Imam al-Bukhari) Please repay
your credit card balance at your earliest convenience. Call [customer service
number].
The design of our experiment has several important features that help us identify the
effect of moral appeals on debt repayment. First, debt repayment is a common and conse-
quential financial decision, which we are able to study using a real-stakes field experiment
integrated into the credit card repayment cycle of a large bank. Second, the messages in
our experiment are sent through the bank’s automated text messaging system, which allows
us to address the moral appeal to delinquent customers directly. Third, the bank routinely
uses text messages to communicate with its customers, and messages with religious or moral
content are not uncommon in this context. Therefore, the channel of communication and
the content of the messages in our experiment are credible and natural in our setting. Fi-
nally, using a number of placebo messages and follow-up surveys, we are able to examine the
mechanism through which moral appeals affect behavior.
We find that moral appeals increase debt repayment. In our baseline specification, receiv-
ing the moral message decreases the share of delinquent customers by 4.4 percentage points
compared to a baseline share of 66 percent in the control group. To assess the economic
magnitude of this effect, we benchmark the impact of moral incentives against that of direct
and indirect financial incentives. Our first benchmark is a cash rebate treatment in which
past-due customers received a message from the bank that offered them a repayment rebate
in the form of principal reduction equal to 50% of their current minimum payment condi-
4The Shahih-al-Bukhari is one of the six major hadith collections of Sunni Islam (Kuttub al-Sittah). It
reports on the sayings, deeds, and teachings of the Prophet, and is widely used in the application of Islamic
law.
3
tional on making a payment before the end of the grace period. Point estimates indicate
that moral incentives are more effective than this substantial financial incentive, and we can
bound the effect of the cash rebate to be no more than 1.2 times the impact of the moral
message. This implies that the bank would have to offer customers a principal reduction
equal to at least 6% of median monthly income to generate the same increase in repaymeant
rates observed in the moral incentives group. In a second benchmarking treatment, past-due
customers received a text message that highlighted the consequences of delinquency on the
future ability to obtain credit. This message induces the strongest (9.8 percentage-point)
reduction in delinquency rates among all of the messages sent as part of our experiment.
While we cannot directly assess the extent to which this treatment provides new information
as opposed to bringing customers’ attention to something they already knew, the message
highlights that the financial stakes of the repayment decision are meaningful—especially
through the effect of a negative credit registry entry on the ability to obtain credit—and the
results show that customers respond strongly when they are reminded of these stakes.
We then use a series of interventions to rule out alternative mechanisms that are unrelated
to the moral appeal, but could trigger repayment in response to receiving the moral message.
First, could the impact of the moral message be due to a simple reminder effect? To test this
possibility, a group of customers were sent a simple reminder message that did not contain
a moral appeal. This message had no significant effect on repayment, which rules out this
channel. Second, does the moral appeal work because it primes customers on religion or
evokes a religious frame of mind? We examine this possibility, using a placebo message,
which included a quote from the Prophet that is taken from the same religious text as the
moral message but makes no reference to the Islamic doctrine on debt repayment, while
still reminding the customer to repay her debt. We find that this message has no impact
on repayment, which rules out an explanation of our main result based on priming religion.
Third, does the moral appeal work because receiving a strongly worded message signals that
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the bank is particularly committed to debt collection? To test this possibility, we surveyed
customers who had received either no message, the basic reminder, or one of several different
versions of the moral message, one day after the final repayment deadline. In the survey,
customers were asked “How committed do you think [bank name] is to collect debt from
delinquent customers?” We find no statistically significant difference in responses to this
question between customers assigned to different treatments. Finally, it is worth noting
that several of our text messages, including the simple reminder and the religious placebo
message, were specifically designed for the experiment and had never before been received
by the bank’s customers. The fact that these messages do not affect repayment also allows
us to rule out the possibility that the moral appeal is effective only because it comes in the
form of a particularly novel or attention-grabbing message.
Having ruled out these alternative channels, we investigate the mechanism through which
moral incentives affect debt repayment. The original moral incentive message explicitly
quoted the Prophet, cited the text from which the quote was taken, and employed a word
of Arabic origin for “injustice” that is often associated with religion. To examine whether
the moral appeal works because of its explicitly religious connotation, we implemented two
variations of the moral message, which successively removed its religious components. The
first message omitted the reference to the Prophet and the religious text from which the quote
was taken, thus allowing us to test whether invoking a credible religious source increases the
effectiveness of the moral appeal. The second message additionally replaced the Arabic-
origin word for “injustice” in the original message with a less formal Indonesian word, which
has the same meaning but no religious connotation. This allows us to test whether the moral
appeal is effective when it is entirely unrelated to religion.
We find that all variations of the moral appeal have very similar effects, which indicates
that either the pure moral statement is sufficient to trigger repayment, or that customers
associate even the non-religious versions of the moral appeal with religion. To disentangle
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these two explanations, we conducted a follow-up survey in which customers in the treatment
and control groups were read the moral appeal and asked whether they associated it with
religion. The results show that this is not the case, suggesting that the effect of the moral
message is driven by the moral statement it contains, rather than the religious context of the
message (although part of the effect may be coming from the way respondents’ religiosity
interacts with the moral content of the message).
We then test whether the message continues to affect repayment when it is sent repeatedly,
and find that the effect of receiving the moral message a second time is very similar to that
of receiving it for the first time. This indicates that the message does not work because of its
novelty, or because it provides new information. Instead, our results are most consistent with
the interpretation that the message temporarily draws attention to the moral of dimension
of the repayment decision and triggers repayment by highlighting that not repaying one’s
debts violates a moral norm.
Finally we test whether, in addition to reducing delinquency, the moral message also
affects default, defined by the bank as remaining more than 90 days past due. Since the card
is a revolving line of credit, full default is extremely costly to the borrower and therefore a
very rare event. With baseline default rates below 0.5% (5% in our sample of late-paying
customers), it is thus not too surprising that our treatments do not significantly reduce
default in the full sample. There is, however, substantial variation in the ex-ante credit
risk of customers, and we show that the moral message significantly reduces default among
customers with high predicted credit risk.5
Overall, our findings suggest that when making important financial decisions, people
experience a utility cost from consciously violating a moral norm, so that moral appeals can
5When we split the sample based on customers’ predicted ex-ante credit risk, we find that the moral
message reduces default by 10.5 percentage points (from a baseline rate of 13%) among the 10% of customers
with the highest credit risk, by 4.2% (from a baseline rate of 11%) among the 25% of customers with the
highest credit risk, and by 2.1 percentage points (from a baseline rate of 8%) for customers with above-median
credit risk.
6
affect behavior, even when neither the moral appeal nor the response to it are observed by
others, and when they do not mention a moral authority, threat of punishment, or adverse
financial consequences.
This paper relates to several strands of the literature. First, our work is related to a
large literature on non-monetary incentives (?????). In particular, we shed light on how
moral appeals affect an important economic decision: the decision to repay one’s debts.
Moral appeals are among the most common strategies of persuasion, and many companies,
for example, advertise their support for fair trade or charitable causes to influence consumer
choices.6 There is a body of evidence both in the lab (see ?) and in the field studying
different types of normative appeals and their impact on a wide range of behaviors, from
evasion of television license fees (?), to tax compliance (??), paying for newspapers (?),
and energy conservation (?). However, to our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide
field evidence that purely moral appeals can affect an important economic decision even
in the absence of confounding factors, such as reminder effects, social effects, or changes
in the perceived material cost of noncompliance. Moreover, we contribute to the literature
by providing evidence of why these appeals work and of how effective they are relative to
financial incentives.
Second, our work contributes to a literature that examines debt accumulation and repay-
ment (see ????). In particular, ? use survey data to study how moral considerations may
play a role in strategic default in the mortgage market. They find that 82% of respondents
believe that it is morally wrong to engage in strategic default, and that those expressing this
opinion are about 10 percentage points less likely to default strategically on their mortgages.
By exploring how messages that emphasize different aspects of the repayment decision affect
6Most closely related to our setting, a number of banks have used television commercials with moral
content to get delinquent borrowers to repay their debt. For example, Indian banks have aired television
and radio commercials with moral appeals made by children in an effort to persuade defaulting borrowers
to repay their loans. See “Banks Make Emotional Appeals to Get Borrowers to Repay Loans ” Live Mint,
October 2016.
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behavior, our results also relate to empirical work on attention and household finance (??).
Beyond helping to understand the role of moral considerations in an important economic
decision, our work is also related to a literature on religion and economic behavior (see ??, ?,
????). Identifying the effect of moral appeals linked to religion is difficult because religious
activities typically combine moral, instrumental, and social motivations. For example, people
may go to church because they believe it is the “right thing to do,” but they may also do
so for indirect material or social benefits, such as socializing or signaling one’s beliefs or
shared values. We add to this literature by showing that moral appeals can meaningfully
affect behavior, even when they make no reference to a religious or moral authority, and in
an environment where the social interactions usually associated with religion are absent.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section ??, we describe the setting and experimental
design. Section ?? presents the results. Section ?? interprets our findings, and Section ??
concludes.
II. Experimental Design
A. The Credit Card
We design a natural field experiment with the universe of late-paying customers of Indonesia’s
most popular Islamic credit card. The credit card is issued by one of the country’s leading
Islamic banks, which offers credit cards as part of its portfolio of Islamic consumer finance
products. Originally introduced in 2009, the card had approximately 200,000 customers at
the time of our experiment.
The credit card is designed to comply with the principles of Islamic law which, among
other prescriptions, prohibits charging interest and investing in activities considered contrary
to the principles of Islam. In order to be fully consistent with Islamic law, the features of
the card are based on a fatwa (legal decree) issued in 2006 by the Indonesian Council of
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Islamic Scholars, which lays out the guidelines under which banks can offer Sharia-compliant
credit cards. Following these rules, the credit card is structured as an Ijara fee structure
contract, which means that customers pay a fee for the transaction services provided by
the card instead of a variable interest rate. Customers are charged fixed annual fees of Rp
120,000 (US$ 10) for a basic card, Rp 240,000 (US$ 20) for a gold card, and Rp 600,000
(US$ 45) for a platinum card, plus a monthly membership fee of 2.75% of the customer’s
credit limit. This monthly fee can be partially or fully refunded through a “cash rebate,”
which is proportional to the customer’s available credit line and can range from zero to the
total monthly fee.7 The fee is waived entirely if there is no outstanding debt.
There is a monthly billing cycle, with a billing date on the eighteenth day of each month.
The minimum monthly payment, equal to either 10% of the customer’s total outstanding
balance or Rp 50,000 (whichever amount is higher) plus possible arrears and overdrafts, is due
on the eighth day of the following month. Customers who do not make the minimum payment
by the due date receive a text message reminder from the bank the following day. The bank
grants customers who miss the due date a repayment grace period of ten days, which ends
on the eighteenth day of each month (we refer to this date as the “repayment deadline”).
Customers who fail to make the minimum payment by this date are considered delinquent
and reported to the Indonesian credit registry, the Sistem Informasi Debitur, which all banks
consult before issuing credit. Even if the debt is eventually repaid, a negative entry remains
on record for 24 months and generally precludes borrowing from any formal sector lender for
that period of time. Additionally, delinquent customers are charged a nominal late payment
fee and their card is automatically blocked.8 Once the customer makes the required minimum
7The cash rebate is calculated as follows: cash rebate = 2.75% × (credit limit - amount outstanding). The
net monthly fee is the monthly membership fee minus the cash rebate, that is, 2.75% × amount outstanding.
8Late payment fees range from Rp 15,000 to Rp 35,000 and increase over time. For example, customers
who are more than 30 days late are charged additional fees ranging from Rp 20,000 to Rp 50,000. However,
to be compliant with Islamic law, the bank is allowed to charge late fees only to compensate for the costs of
debt collection, including follow-up and legal costs.
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payment, the card is immediately unblocked. If a customer’s payment remains outstanding
for more than 90 days after the due date, the customer is considered in default, the card is
permanently blocked and the account is closed. Accounts that remain more than 120 days
overdue are sent to the bank’s collections department and eventually referred to an outside
collections agency.
B. Sample Population and Random Assignment
The population for our experiment comprises the 14,429 credit card customers who were
more than one week past due on their minimum payment at least once during one of the
six months between February 2015 and April 2016 in which the experiment was carried
out.9 Because some customers were late more than once during this period, there are 23,520
observations in our sample frame.10
The experiment was conducted in six waves, coinciding with the monthly credit card
repayment cycle.11 Each month, the bank shared with us the list of customers that had not
made the minimum required payment by the sixteenth day of the month (two days before the
final repayment deadline at the end of the ten days grace period) but had previously been
current on their payment schedule (that is, they had made the previous month’s minimum
9The experiment was conducted in February, March, May, and June 2015, and February and April 2016.
We originally planned to have one treatment group that would receive restructuring offers in April 2015.
However, the partner bank was not able to immediately operationalize this. Upon agreement with the bank,
we then decided to pause our main intervention in April 2015 and to resume in May 2015. In May 2015, the
bank attempted to implement the restructuring offers with a sample of 200 customers but faced problems
with the implementation and customer response to this treatment. We exclude these 200 observations from
our analysis. We also ran a small pilot with 250 customers in January 2015, whose results were similar to
those of our main intervention.
10Among the universe of 14,429 customers, 8,691 were late only once, while the remainder appeared in
our sample more than once: 3,052 customers were late twice, 1,414 were late three times, 579 four times,
191 five times, and 52 were late in all six months.
11The first three waves of the experiment were conducted in February, March, and May 2015. The last
three waves were conducted in June 2015, and February and April 2016. As part of a parallel experiment for
a second paper, we had two other treatment groups with customers receiving multiple text messages on the
same day. We excluded those 2,000 observations from our analysis. Results are unaffected when we include
these observations, and are reported in the online appendix. In the notes to Table ?? we also discuss some
design and implementation issues which affect the interpretation of results from these additional treatments.
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payment on time). In the main experiment, we excluded from this list all customers who had
previously received a text message treatment. Customers assigned to the control group in a
previous month remained in the sample and could either be assigned to one of the treatments
or form part of the control group again.12 For example, in March 2015, 4,803 customers were
more than one week late. Out of these, 1,018 had previously received a treatment message
and were thus excluded from the sample; the remaining 3,785 customers were assigned to one
of the treatment conditions or the control group. Following this process, we obtain a dataset
that includes 13,428 observations, representing 12,104 unique credit card customers.13
Eligible customers were randomly assigned to one of several treatment conditions or to a
control group. As part of the bank’s standard communications policy, all customers received
a neutral text message reminder one day after they had missed the due date (that is, when
they were one day past due). The 4,120 customers assigned to the control group received
no other text from the bank, while the 9,308 customers assigned to one of the treatment
conditions received additional information through a text message sent two days before the
repayment deadline (that is, when they were seven days past due). All treatments were
randomly assigned at the individual customer level and delivered through text messages
12When looking at a long term outcomes, such as default, we exclude customers who were in the control
group in a given month, reappeared in the sample in a following month, and were randomized to receive a
treatment message before their long term behavior was observed. In fact, long term outcomes in the control
condition are not observable for these customers. The outcomes are however observed for similar customers
who were re-randomized into the control condition. To maintain representativeness, when looking at default
we re-weight the sample by giving more weight to these latter customers who appeared in the control group
more than once.
13Of these 13,428 observations, 10,903 customers appear on the list of late-payers only once, 1,088 appear
twice (the first time in the control group), 104 appear three times (the first two times in the control group),
6 appear four times (the first three times in the control group), and 1 customer appears 5 times (the first
four times in the control group). Although this approach does not affect the internal validity of our analysis,
it could potentially reduce the representativeness of our sample, since in a given month, customers who
previously received a treatment message could have ended up on the list of late payers if they had been
assigned to the control group instead. However, given that the effect of our treatments is very similar
for subjects appearing in the sample for the first time and those previously assigned to the control group,
re-weighting the sample to correct for the probability of being excluded does not affect our results.
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using the bank’s existing customer notification system.14,15 Figure ?? summarizes the credit
card billing cycle and the timeline of our intervention.
In February and April 2016, we conducted a separate follow-up experiment with the 898
customers who reappeared on the list of late payers and had previously received the moral
message as part of the main experiment. The experiment was designed to test whether
the moral message only works the first time it is sent—for example, because it is novel
or conveys new information—or whether sending the message repeatedly could still affect
repayment. Following the same procedure and timing as above, recurrent late payers were
randomly assigned either to a control group or to a repeated message treatment group.16
The 450 customers assigned to the control group again only received a neutral reminder one
day after they missed the required minimum payment. The 448 customers assigned to the
repeated moral message treatment group received a moral message identical to the one they
had previously received. As in the main experiment, this message was sent two days before
the repayment deadline at the end of the ten-day grace period granted by the bank.
C. Experimental Treatments
1. Control Group
A total of 4,120 customers were assigned to the control group, which forms the basis of
comparison throughout the experiment. Customers in this group received a single reminder
one day after they had missed the required minimum monthly payment:
Your [name of the card] has reached the due date. Please make a payment at your
earliest convenience. If you have already paid, ignore this text. Call [customer
14All messages were in Bahasa Indonesia, the official language of Indonesia, which is also the standard
language used by the bank in all of its customer communications.
15Online appendix Figure A.2 summarizes the experimental design.
16We stratify on how recently the customer had received the first moral message: 364 customers were
treated two months before reappearing in the late-payer list, while the other 534 customers were treated for
the first time between eight and fourteen months before.
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service number].
While all other customers received an additional message from the bank two days before the
repayment deadline, customers in the control group received only this initial reminder.
2. Moral Incentives
To test the impact of moral appeals, we assigned 2,244 participants to the moral incentive
treatment condition. In addition to the basic reminder sent to all customers who missed the
due date, these customers received an additional message drawing attention to the moral
implications of not repaying one’s debts. The message quotes from the Shahih al-Bukhari, one
of the main religious texts of Sunni Islam, which reports of the teachings, deeds, and sayings
of the Prophet Muhammad and serves as one of the main sources for the interpretation of
Islamic law. The quote highlights the religious doctrine on repayment of debts and asks the
customer to repay her outstanding balance:
The Prophet (Peace and blessings be upon Him) says: “non-repayment of debts
by someone who is able to repay is an injustice” (Imam al-Bukhari). Please repay
your credit card balance at your earliest convenience. Call [customer service
number].
To better understand the mechanisms underlying the impact of moral appeals, we imple-
mented two additional variations of this treatment, which varied the degree of its religious
content. The first variation of the message (the implicit moral incentive treatment condition)
removed the reference to the Prophet and the text from which the quote was taken. This
message, assigned to 1,180 customers, reads:
Non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice. Please
repay your credit card balance at your earliest convenience. Call [customer service
number].
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The second variation of the message (the non-religious moral incentive treatment condi-
tion), which was assigned to 1,186 customers, not only omitted the reference to the Prophet
and the source of the quote, but also replaced the Arabic-origin term for “injustice” (kezal-
iman) with the standard Indonesian word (ketidakadilan), which is more colloquial and has
no religious connotation.
The first variation of the moral message allows us to test whether a moral appeal is
strengthened by invoking a credible religious source. The second message tests whether re-
ceiving a moral statement without any explicit religious connotation can affect the repayment
decision.
3. Direct Financial Incentives: Cash Rebate
To benchmark the effect of moral appeals against direct financial incentives, we implemented
a treatment consisting of a direct one-time monetary incentive in the form of a large cash
rebate. In this cash rebate treatment condition, the bank sent the standard reminder on the
due date and an additional message two days before the repayment deadline, in which cus-
tomers were offered a rebate equal to 50% of their currently outstanding minimum payment,
conditional on making the required minimum payment by the deadline.17 The rebate would
then be credited against expenditures in the next billing cycle starting three days after the
offer is made, so that the reward is available to customers practically right after they make
a payment. This treatment was assigned to 336 participants, using a message which reads
as follows:
This month, make your credit card payment to get a cash rebate equal to 50% of
your minimum payment on your next statement. Please repay your credit card
balance at your earliest convenience. Call [customer service number].
17The current minimum payment is based on spending in the previous billing cycle and therefore unaffected
by the borrower’s current or future spending.
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For this treatment to serve as a useful benchmark, we need to be sure that customers
do not misinterpret the offer and understand that the size of the rebate is independent of
their current or future behavior. We took several steps to verify that this was the case.
First, the rebate offer was designed in close cooperation with the bank, and we ensured that
the wording was clear and similar to the bank’s usual customer communications.18 Second,
we closely monitored the treatment implementation and found no indication that customers
were confused about the offer, or contacted the bank with requests for clarification. Since
the rebate is credited in the next billing cycle (which starts three days after a customer
receives the financial incentive offer), one could also be concerned that customers might
erroneously believe that the incentive is proportional to the payment due in the following
cycle, as opposed to the current amount due, which comprises expenditures for the previous
billing cycle, which ended before the rebate was offered. If customers erroneously consider
the size of the rebate to be under their control, one would expect them to reduce current
repayment and increase spending to increase the rebate amount. We test for this and find
that neither of these patterns are present in the data. There were also no instances in which a
customer disputed the rebate amount they received. Finally, we conduct a customer survey,
to measure respondents’ preferences for deposits on their checking account versus statement
credit which verified that customers value a cash rebate in the form of statement credit
nearly as much as immediate cash. We can thus reliably use this treatment to benchmark
the effect of moral incentives, and express it in terms of the size of conditional principal
reductions the bank would have offer to achieve the same increase in repayment rates as the
moral message.
18The bank frequently uses rebates and discount offers in its marketing activities, so that customers in
our sample were familiar with this type of offer. Moreover, as described above, a cash rebate similar to our
treatment, is an inherent feature of the card’s pricing structure.
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4. Indirect Financial Incentives: Credit Reputation
To test the effect of indirect financial incentives, we implemented another benchmarking
treatment, consisting of a message highlighting the consequences of non-repayment for the
customer’s credit record and their ability to obtain credit in the future. In this credit reputa-
tion treatment, customers received the standard reminder on the due date and an additional
message two days before the repayment deadline. The message stated that non-repayment
will result in the customer being reported to the Indonesian credit registry, the Sistem Infor-
masi Debitur, which will diminish access to credit in the future. This message was assigned
to 2,000 customers and reads as follows:19
Late payments are reported monthly to Bank Indonesia Sistem Informasi Debitur
(SID), which all banks consult. This will diminish your ability to get credit in
the future. Please repay your credit card balance at your earliest convenience.
Call [customer service number].
5. Placebo: Simple Reminder
We assigned 1,362 customers to the simple reminder placebo treatment. Customers in this
treatment condition received the standard reminder on the due date and an additional neutral
reminder two days before the repayment deadline.20 This second reminder is similar to the
standard message sent to all customers who miss the due date and makes no reference to
19We designed two variations of this text message and randomly assigned 1,000 customers to each of two
subgroups. The first subgroup received the message in the main text. The second group received a text
that says “Late payments are reported monthly to Bank Indonesia Sistem Informasi Debitur (SID), which
all banks can consult. Please repay your card balance at your earliest convenience. Call [customer service
number].” We pool these two treatments in our analysis, since their effect on repayment is not statistically
different.
20A number of customers were additionally assigned to this treatment condition in the last wave of the
experiment to compare the effect of the moral incentive to that of a simple reminder on outcomes measured
in a phone survey. The survey asked whether customers would like to receive the same text message again,
and how committed they thought the bank is to collecting debt. The survey instrument is available in the
online appendix.
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the moral or financial implications of non-repayment:
The due date of your [name of the card] bill was on [due date] and your payment
has not been received yet. Please repay your credit card balance at your earliest
convenience. Call [customer service number].
We use this treatment to test how receiving a second reminder affects repayment through
channels such as limited attention and memory. Comparing its effect to that of moral
incentives allows us to distinguish the impact of moral appeals from the effect of receiving
additional reminders.
6. Placebo: Religious Message
Finally, we assigned 1,000 customers to a religious placebo treatment condition. This treat-
ment is designed to address the possibility that borrower behavior could be affected by
priming religion.21 Customers in this treatment group received the standard message on the
due date and an additional message with a quote from the Prophet taken from the same
source used in the moral incentive treatment condition, two days before the repayment dead-
line. However, in contrast to the moral incentive message, this quote made no reference to
financial matters or debt repayment:
The Prophet (Peace and blessings be upon Him) says: “When Allah wishes good
for someone, He bestows upon him the understanding of the Book” (Imam al-
Bukhari). Please repay your credit card balance at your earliest convenience.
Call [customer service number].
21Laboratory experiments have shown that religious primes can induce prosocial behavior, increasing
the amount shared in dictator games (?), reducing cheating (??), and increasing charitable donations (?).
Priming religion also increases punishment of unfair behavior, but only among religiously committed subjects
(??).
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This treatment allows us to test whether moral appeals work because they highlight the
moral implications of a specific action—the non-repayment of debts—or simply because they
remind recipients of the religious nature of their contract with the bank or evoke a religious
frame of mind.
D. Data and Summary Statistics
The dataset we use in our analysis combines the results from the experiment with admin-
istrative data from our partner bank, and information from a number of follow-up phone
surveys administered to the bank’s customers.
1. Administrative Data
We first obtained bank data on customer account characteristics (age, gender, religion,
province, monthly income, and credit limit) for the universe of past-due customers in our
sample. Table ?? reports summary statistics and presents a test of random assignment.22
The median credit card customer in our sample is male, 41 years old, has a monthly income
of Rp 5,000,000 (US$ 375), a credit limit of Rp 10,000,000 (US$ 750) and Rp 7,739,015
(US$ 580) of credit card debt.23 As expected given random assignment, the sample is well
balanced across all baseline characteristics.24
In a second step, the bank shared data on credit card repayment for customers in our
sample after each wave of the experiment, as well as historical repayment data covering the
12 months prior to our intervention. In the monthly repayment data, we observe a customer’s
delinquency status (whether the customer made the required monthly minimum payment
22See Table A.2 in the online appendix for summary statistics and a test of random assignment for the
follow-up experiment.
23For comparison, Indonesia’s per capita income was US$3,491 (approximately US$ 291 per month) at
the time of the experiment (?).
24Our sample is also very similar to the universe of the bank’s credit card customers along most observable
dimensions. Late payers are only marginally more likely to be female (40% versus 37%) and, on average,
have a slightly lower credit limit (Rp 13.6 million versus Rp 14.7 million).
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by the end of the grace period), which is the main outcome of interest for our analysis.
The bank also provided further financial data, including information on credit card usage
and savings accounts for a subset of customers. In particular, we collected data on savings
account balances for all customers in the first four waves of the main experiment who have
an account with our partner bank.25 The bank also provided us with data on credit card
default, defined as failing to make the required minimum payment within 90 days from the
due date.26
2. Survey Data
We combine data from the experiment with information from a number of phone surveys
administered to the bank’s credit card customers.27 The main survey, conducted in June
and July 2015, asked respondents about their level of religiosity and their familiarity with
the quote used in the three variations of the moral incentive treatment condition. The
same survey was also administered to a randomly drawn sample of the bank’s credit card
customers all over Indonesia who were not late on their payments during the sample period.
We use the results from this survey to construct a measure of local religiosity for the regions
in which credit card customers reside.
An additional survey was administered one day after the repayment deadline in April
2016 to a random sample of credit card customers who had participated in the experiment
that month. The purpose of this survey was to test whether the moral appeal signals that the
bank is particularly committed to debt collection, whether receiving it causes any disutility to
25The bank’s customers are not required to have a checking or savings account with the bank in order to
obtain a credit card. The most common deposit account at our bank is a liquid savings (tabungan) account.
At the time of the experiment, 30 customers had a checking account and 1,088 customers had a savings
account at the bank.
26Data on savings accounts and longer-term repayment was available only up to August 2015. At the
time the data were collected, default was thus realized only for customers in the first three waves of the main
experiment, the third wave being implemented in May 2015.
27The survey instruments are available in the online appendix.
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customers, and to measure whether the credit reputation message increases knowledge about
the credit reporting system. Respondents in the survey sample had previously received either
no treatment message, the basic reminder, or one of the versions of the moral message. The
survey first asked these customers how committed they thought the bank was to collect debts.
Second, it asked whether they wished to receive text messages like the one they had received
a few days earlier in the future. Third, customers were randomized in two groups: those
in a treatment group were read the content of the reputational incentive message, while
those in a control group were not given any information. All customers were then asked
questions about the Indonesian credit registry and their beliefs about the consequences of
non-repayment.
In April 2017 we selected a random sample of credit card customers for a final survey.
These were customers who had participated in the experiment in June 2015—the month in
which the cash rebate treatment was conducted—but had not been offered the rebate. The
purpose of this survey was to elicit customer preferences for an immediate deposit into their
bank account relative to a delayed cash rebate on their next credit card statement (identical
to how the cash rebate treatment was implemented) using a non-incentivized multiple price
list procedure.28
3. Main Outcome of Interest
Our main outcome of interest is delinquency. The bank considers a customer to be delinquent
if she fails to make the required minimum payment by the end of the ten-day grace period,
28The survey conducted in June and July 2015 was administered to 2,274 participants of our experiment
and to other 567 randomly selected customers. The survey conducted in April 2016 was administered to
93 randomly selected participants of the experiment that month, stratified by treatment group. Finally,
the survey conducted in April 2017 was administered to 98 customers who are similar along observables to
the 336 customers who received the cash rebate. Response rates and initial sample sizes for these surveys
are 43% and 5,233, 41% and 1,399, 20% and 460, and 25% and 400, respectively. In some of the surveys,
response rates are correlated with observables (for example, in the first survey women are less responsive
than men). Response rates are, however, never correlated with treatment assignment.
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which occurs at the eighteenth day of the month. Accordingly, we measure delinquency as a
dummy variable equal to one if a customer fails to make the required payment by the end of
the grace period and zero otherwise. When a customer becomes delinquent, the bank reports
them to the Indonesian credit registry, their card is automatically blocked, their account is
charged a late payment fee, and they may receive phone calls from the bank’s collection
department.
E. Estimation
Since treatment status was randomly assigned, our identification strategy is straightforward.
We identify experimental treatment effects using regressions of the form:
Yi = α +
∑
c
βcIc,i + γ
′Xi + ǫi, (1)
where Yi is an outcome of interest, such as an indicator for customer i being delinquent.
The variables Ic,i are indicators for customer i, assigned to treatment condition c. In some
specifications, we additionally include a vector of control variables, Xi, which contains either
month fixed effects only, or month fixed effects as well as a set of customer and account
characteristics. In all regressions, the omitted category is the control group, which received
only a basic reminder on the due date but no second text message two days prior to the
repayment deadline.29
The results reported in the regression tables are based on sampling-based inference. In
the text, we also report the results of randomization-based inference, where we calculate
Fisher exact p-values for the sharp null hypothesis of no effect. As sample statistics, we
use the difference in means by treatment status. Given the large sample size, calculation of
29Since we do not observe whether customers open the messages they receive, all of our results should be
interpreted as intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates. Note, however, that all messages are sent from the bank, so
that there is no reason to believe that customers are more or less likely to open messages associated with a
specific treatment.
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the sample statistic for all possible realizations of the treatment assignment mechanism is
computationally not feasible. For this reason, p-values for our permutation tests are based
on 10,000 iterations using random sampling with replacement from the universe of possible
treatment assignments, while holding the probability of being treated constant. To compare
the effect of different treatments to that of moral incentives, the text also reports 95%
confidence intervals for the ratio between the effect of each treatment and moral incentives.
III. Results
A. Main Result: Moral Incentives
We first examine the effect of the moral message on delinquency. Table ??, shows treatment
effect estimates for the moral incentive message across all waves of the experiment. In column
(1), we begin by presenting results from a regression without controls, which represents
raw delinquency rates. Compared to the control group, the share of delinquent customers
decreases by 4.4 percentage points under the moral incentive treatment condition. The
difference in delinquency rates is significant at the 1 percent level (p-value < 0.001). Using
randomization-based inference, we also reject the null hypothesis that the moral incentive
treatment had no effect (Fisher exact p-value < 0.001). We add month fixed effects in column
(2) and customer-level covariates in column (3). The results remain very similar across all
specifications, indicating that the randomization was successful. Treatment effects range
from -4.4 percentage points to -5.2 percentage points relative to a baseline delinquency rate
of 66% in the control group. The treatment effect is similar for men and women, and also
does not differ by age, religion, or whether a customer has appeared on the list of late payers
at least once in the 12 months before our intervention.30 The effect is stronger for customers
30Fewer than 10% of customers in our sample are non-Muslim, so that it is not possible to estimate
this effect precisely. We discuss heterogeneity by local religiosity in Section ??. Heterogeneous treatment
effects are reported in Table A.3 in the online appendix. Importantly, the fact that the effect is the same
for customers who were delinquent in the 12 months prior to the intervention and customers who were
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with a lower debt-to-income ratio, which suggests that the treatment response is moderated
by financial constraints. We find that the same pattern also holds for the credit reputation
treatment.
B. Benchmarking the Moral Incentive Effect
1. Direct Financial Incentives: Cash Rebate
To assess the economic magnitude of the moral incentive effect, we conduct two benchmark-
ing exercises, in which we compare the impact of the moral message against that of direct
and indirect financial incentives. In our first benchmarking treatment, the bank sent text
messages to a randomly chosen subset of customers and offered them a cash rebate in the
form of a principal reduction equal to 50% of their outstanding minimum payment, con-
ditional on making the required payment before the deadline. Customers assigned to this
treatment were informed that this rebate would be credited to their account in the next
billing cycle. The median rebate offered was Rp 380,000 (equal to 8% of monthly earnings
for the median customer in our sample), and the average rebate offered was Rp 500,000.
This treatment allows us to measure the impact of moral incentives in monetary terms, and
identify the amount of financial incentives the bank would need to provide to generate the
same reduction in delinquency rates as the moral incentive message.
The results of the financial incentive treatment are reported in Table ??. We do not
find a statistically significant effect of financial incentives on repayment, nor a significant
difference between the effect of moral and financial incentives.31 This is mainly due to the
not, implies that customers who generally pay late and customers who generally pay on time are equally
responsive to moral appeals and suggests that our estimates could potentially generalize to the population
of customers who typically repay their card debt in time in the absence of any intervention.
31In the month when both treatments were run concurrently, point estimates indicate that the cash rebate
treatment had an effect of -2.1 percentage points compared to -5.4 percentage points for moral incentives.
The 95% confidence interval for the ratio between the coefficient of financial incentives and the coefficient of
moral incentives is [-1.069; 1.196].
23
limited sample size, which was the result of the partner bank not wanting to incur the
comparatively high cost of the rebate (Rp 540,000 for the average person who took up the
offer, compared to practically no cost for the moral message). We can nonetheless use the
results to obtain a conservative benchmark for the size of the moral incentive effect. While
point estimates indicate moral incentives being more effective than financial incentives, we
can use the confidence interval to conservatively bound the effect of moral incentives to be
at least 84% of the effect of financial incentives. This suggests that moral incentives are at
least as effective as a statement credit reward of Rp 317,726 or approximately 6% of the
median monthly income of customers in our sample (1/1.196, or 84% of the median rebate
offered).32
2. Indirect Financial Incentives: Credit Reputation
In a second benchmarking exercise, we compare the effect of the moral message to that of
reputational incentives —another type of material incentive that has been shown to be im-
portant in similar contexts.33 Our test uses a treatment in which the bank sent text messages
that informed late-paying customers of the existence of the Indonesian credit registry and
the consequences of being reported for non-repayment. The message stated that all banks
32Because the cash rebate treatment is a conditional offer, credited to a customer’s account in the next
month, we conduct several exercises to rule out potential confounding factors. First, we ensure that bor-
rowers are not confused about the content of the offer and timing of the rebate. We closely monitored the
implementation and found no instances in which customers asked questions indicating that they had not
understood the offer or contacted the bank with fuerther questions or complaints about the offer. Second,
we conduct an elicitation exercise (using a non-incentivized phone survey with past-due clients) to show
that customers do not strongly discount statement credit relative to immediate cash deposits. This exercise
indicates that on average customers value Rp 100 in statement credit next month the same as an immediate
Rp 92 cash deposit into their account. Importantly, 79% of customers value statement credit exactly the
same as immediate cash, and even the lowest decile values statement credit as much as an immediate Rp
90 cash deposit. At the same time, 6% of customers do not give any value to a principal reduction. This
is consistent with these customers planning to default on their debt and completely discounting statement
credit: default rates in our sample are indeed about 5% in our sample of late-payers (below 0.5% in the
entire customer population).
33See, for example, ? and ? for evidence on credit reporting and loan repayment, and ? for evidence on
the willingness to pay for a good credit reputation among credit card borrowers in an emerging market.
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in Indonesia consult the credit registry before issuing credit, so that a registry entry will
prevent a customer from accessing formal credit in the future.34 In addition to seerving as
a benchmark for the moral incentive effect, we can also use this treatment to examine the
possibility that customers of an Islamic bank might be especially unresponsive to material
incentives.
Table ?? reports results. In terms of raw delinquency rates, reported in column (1), the
credit reputation message decreases the probability of becoming delinquent by 9.8 percentage
points, as compared to 6.0 percentage points for the moral incentive message over the same
time period. We can use randomization-based inference and reject the sharp null hypotheses
that reputational incentives had no effect (Fisher exact p-value < 0.001), or that they had the
same effect as the moral incentive message (Fisher exact p-value=0.049). The results remain
very similar in columns (2) and (3), where we add month fixed effects and covariates.35 These
results indicate that customers in our sample do respond to the material incentives linked to
their credit reputation. As above, we can calculate the 95% confidence interval for the ratio
between the cash rebate coefficient and the credit reputation coefficient, and use it to obtain
a conservative benchmark for the size of the reputational incentive treatment effect. In this
case, the confidence interval is [-0.524; 0.586], implying the effect of reputational incentives
to be at least 171% of the effect of financial incentives. This suggests that the bank would
have to offer a statement credit reward of Rp 648,464, or approximately 13% of median
monthly income, to obtain the same effect as the credit reputation message. If we assume
that the credit reputation treatment moves beliefs about the probability of the existence of
the credit registry from zero to one, we can interpret this number as the willingness to pay for
34Survey evidence indicates that this treatment does not necessarily increase customers’ knowledge of how
the registry functions but instead simply makes customers think that the consequences of being reported to
the credit registry are severe.
35The 95% confidence interval for the ratio between the credit reputation and moral incentive coefficients
is [1.041; 3.059].
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a clean credit record.36 ? shows that credit card borrowers in Chile are willing to pay 11% of
their median monthly income to maintain a clean credit record, so that our results provide
suggestive evidence that the customers in our setting are no less responsive to reputational
incentives than customers of a regular bank in an emerging economy where debt repayment
decisions have no religious association.37,38
C. Ruling Out Other Mechanisms
The results so far establish that receiving the moral message substantially decreases credit
card delinquency. However, there are several mechanisms other than responsiveness to the
moral appeal that could explain this effect. In this section, we present a number of tests to
evaluate alternative channels and show which of these potential explanations can be ruled
out.
36The assumption that probabilities shift from zero to one gives the most conservative estimate of the
willingness to pay for a clean credit record: any other intermediate shift in beliefs would result in a higher
estimate of the willingness to pay.
37Note that it is difficult to use the credit reputation treatment as a direct benchmark, since the treatment
combines the effect of learning about the existence if the credit registry with the effect of being made
aware of the consequences of non-repayment. To gain a better understanding of how the credit reputation
treatment affects customers’ decisions, we conducted a small follow-up survey. In this survey, customers
were randomized into two groups: customers in a treatment group were read the content of the reputational
incentive message, while customers in a control group were not given any information. All participants were
then asked some questions about the Indonesian credit registry. The results from the survey suggest that
late paying customers are poorly informed about how the credit registry works, and that the reputational
incentive message does not increase their knowledge of how the registry functions. Instead, the message
seems to make customers believe that the consequences of being reported to the credit registry are more
severe.
38In an additional benchmarking exercise, we express the impact of the moral incentive message in terms
of persuasion rates, as suggested by ?, which makes it possible to compare the impact of moral incentives to
effect sizes from other studies that have used non-monetary incentives. The persuasion rate of an intervention
is defined as the change in behavior generated, scaled by exposure to the treatment and the population share
left to be persuaded. Formally, this can be expressed as f = 100 ∗ yT−yC
eT−eC
1
1−y0
, where ei is the share of
group i receiving the message, yi is the share of group i adopting the behavior of interest, and y0 is the
counterfactual share that would change behavior if there were no message. Using this approach, we show
that the magnitude of the moral incentive effect (persuasion rate of approximately 7%) is comparable to the
impact of other types of non-monetary incentives documented in the literature. The full results are available
in the online appendix.
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1. Reminding Customers
First, receiving a text message might increase repayment rates simply because it acts as
a reminder, irrespective of whether the message contains a moral appeal or not (see, for
example, ?). To address this possibility, we compare repayment in the moral incentive
treatment group to repayment among customers assigned to the simple reminder placebo
treatment, which consisted of a basic non-religious reminder that made no reference to
morality or religion and was sent at the same time as the moral message. The results,
reported in Table ??, show that receiving the simple reminder has no effect on repayment.
The raw delinquency rate is 65% in the group receiving the basic reminder, compared to
66% in the control group. The p-value of the difference between the simple reminder and
the control is 0.714 (Fisher exact p-value=0.729), and the p-value of the difference between
the simple reminder and the moral message is 0.013 (Fisher exact p-value=0.015). We can
therefore rule out that the moral message works simply because it reminds customers to
repay their debt.39
2. Priming Religion
Second, receiving a text message with religious content could affect the repayment decision
through priming effects, which are also unrelated to moral suasion. The moral message might,
for example, remind recipients of the religious connotation of the credit contract or evoke a
religious frame of mind more generally. To rule out this possibility, we compare repayment
in the moral incentive treatment group to repayment among customers who received the
religious placebo message. The religious placebo message contains a quote from the Prophet
that is taken from the same religious text as the quote used in the moral message but makes
no reference to the Islamic doctrine on debt repayment while still reminding customers to
39See Table A.5 in the online appendix for results where the simple reminder is used as the main com-
parison group.
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repay their credit card debt. The results, reported in Table ??, show that the religious
placebo message has no effect on the repayment rate. The raw delinquency rate is 65%
in the group receiving the religious reminder and thus nearly identical to the delinquency
rate in the control group. The p-value of the difference between the religious placebo and
the control is 0.889 (Fisher exact p-value=0.904), and the p-value of the difference between
the religious placebo and the moral message is 0.007 (same as the Fisher excact p-value),
indicating that the effect of the moral message is also not driven by priming religion.
3. Novelty of the Message
Third, customers may respond to the message not because of its moral content, but because
it is novel or attention-grabbing. To test for this possibility, we consider delinquency rates
under different text message treatments that use new content. Note that several of the mes-
sages that were sent to credit card customers as part of the experiment—including the simple
reminder, religious placebo, and financial reminder messages—were specifically designed for
the study, and had never previously been received by the bank’s customers. The fact that
none of these messages had a statistically significant effect on repayment allows us to rule
out that the effect of the moral message is explained by the novelty of the message. We
can also rule out the possibility that receiving a message with religious content and a quote
from the Prophet is particularly attention-grabbing, using the religious placebo treatment
condition. The messages sent in this treatment use a quote from the Prophet that is taken
from the same religious text. However, as we show above, this message has no effect on debt
repayment.
4. Signaling the Bank’s Commitment to Debt Collection
Finally, since customers had previously received a text message at the time of the due
date, receiving a second message could be perceived as a signal that the bank is particularly
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committed to debt collection, which could affect delinquentcy rates independent of the moral
appeal. To address this possibility, the bank sent the placebo reminder message and one of
the three variations of the moral message described above to customers that had not been
previously treated. Another group of customers was randomly assigned to a control group
and received no message. We conducted a phone survey with customers in both groups
the day after the payment deadline and asked “How committed do you think [bank name]
is to collect debt from delinquent customers on a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is not very
committed, and 5 is very committed)?” The percentage of respondents answering 4 or 5 is
76% in the control group, 67% in the basic reminder group, and only 59% among customers
that received a moral message (the p-value for the test of equality of all three coefficients
is 0.302, and the p-value of the test of equality between respondents in the control group
and the treatment group is 0.124). Hence, there is no evidence to suggest that receiving
the moral message prompts repayment because it is perceived as a signal that the bank is
particularly committed to enforce outstanding debts.40,41
D. Disutility from Receiving the Message
While our results show that moral incentives are effective at getting customers to repay their
credit card debt, it is unclear whether this comes at a utility cost to customers. To examine
this possibility, the bank called back a subset of customers who had received either the simple
reminder or one of the versions of the moral incentive message as part of a follow-up survey
40We also obtained the repayment history of all clients in our sample from the partner bank, and use this
information to test whether the response to the moral incentive treatment differs, depending on whether
a customer appears on the list of late payers for the first time or has been delinquent before. We find no
evidence that this is the case.
41These findings also relate to those in ?, where reframing debt non-repayment from an error of “omission”
to an error of “commission” increased the repayment of tax debts. The paper also finds that the act of
commission is associated with greater beliefs about punishment for non-repayment, which is the authors’
preferred interpretation for the results. In our setting, since there are no changes in beliefs about punishment
from the bank, the findings indicate an association of commission with greater moral costs. This suggests
that the mechanism of moral penalties might also be at play, in addition to the main channel proposed in
that paper.
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one business day after the messages were sent (messages were sent on Friday and surveys were
conducted on the next Monday). These customers were asked the question “[Bank name]
is sending reminder messages to its customers to help them make their payment on time.
You received one of this messages last week. Would you like to receive the same message
again in the future?” The share of customers responding that they would like to receive the
message again was 80%, both for those who had received a placebo reminder and those who
had received one of the variations of the moral message. The fact that a large majority
of customers would like to receive similar messages in the future suggests that receiving a
moral appeal does not impose a disutility on the recipients. Moreover, receiving a message
containing a moral appeal does not seem to create a differential disutility, compared to a
simple reminder.
As an additional test, we examine whether sending a moral appeal negatively affects
the bank by reducing card usage or transaction volumes (for example, customers might be
dissatisfied with the bank after receiving the message, or may want to avoid receiving a
similar message in the future). We find that this is not the case. In the 30-day window
after the intervention, the average amount spent is Rp 1,130,299 for customers that received
the moral message, and Rp 1,186,966 for customers in the control group (p-value=0.535).
The probability of card usage during this time period is .434 and .450 respectively (p-
value=0.265).42
IV. Interpreting the Results
A. What Drives the Moral Appeal
The evidence in the previous section rules out several mechanisms that are unrelated to
moral suasion but could generate higher repayment rates in response to the moral message.
42These results also hold for different time windows after receiving the message.
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We next explore competing hypotheses that might explain why the moral appeal is effective,
and present tests to distinguish between these alternative explanations.
1. Religious Connotation of the Message?
The first possibility is that the moral message reduces delinquency only because it is delivered
in a religious context. This seems plausible, since the original moral incentive message
explicitly quotes the Prophet and cites an important religious text as its source. Moreover,
the original moral incentive message used a word for “injustice” that is of Arabic origin and
often used in a religious context, so that the moral appeal could be associated with religion
even if explicit references to its source are removed.
In order to distinguish the effect of the religious connotation of the moral message from
that of the moral appeal, the bank sent two additional variations of the moral message to
a randomly chosen subset of credit card customers. The first message was identical to the
main treatment, but omitted the reference to the Prophet and the source of the quote. The
second variation of the moral message omitted the reference to the Prophet, the source of
the quote, and additionally replaced the Arabic-origin word for “injustice” with the standard
Indonesian word, which has no religious connotation. Hence, the first message tests whether
adding a credible religious source adds power to the impact of a moral appeal. The second
message tests whether receiving a simple moral appeal without any religious connotation can
affect the repayment decision.
The results are reported in Table ??. The three versions of the moral message had nearly
identical effects on raw delinquency in the months in which they were sent (4.1 percentage
points for the religious moral message and 3.9 percentage points for the other two versions).
Fisher exact p-values for the null hypothesis of no effect against the religious moral message
are 0.938 for the non-religious moral message and 0.967 for the implicit moral message
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(while Fisher exact p-value against the control group are 0.039 in both cases).43 This could
indicate that either customers already associated the moral appeal contained in the message
with religion or were able to identify it as a saying of the Prophet, or that the pure moral
statement was sufficient to increase repayment. To disentangle these competing hypotheses,
we conducted a follow-up phone survey with a random sample of credit card customers.
In this phone survey, the message with the standard Indonesian word for “injustice” and
without reference to the Prophet was read to participants of the experiment, who were then
asked to indicate its source.44 The vast majority of clients were not immediately aware of
the religious origin of the message. When asked “Who do you think might have said this
phrase?”, out of 5 given options, 76% chose “I don’t know”, whereas only 20% associated
the phrase with religious figures or institutions (including the bank itself). These findings
suggest that the reduction in delinquency is not the result of an implicit association of the
statement contained in the moral message with religion. These results also corroborate the
view that our sample is relatively secular: most clients did not recognize the statement as
the Islamic doctrine on non-repayment of debts.
The follow-up survey also helps us further clarify the role of religiosity in explaining our
results. In the survey, respondents were asked about the importance of religion and the
rules of Islamic law in their life, using a 1-5 Likert scale. Additionally, the survey asked
customers to rank the relative importance of family, work, friends, and religion. Because of
the relatively small sample size of the survey, we cannot directly use this measure to assess the
individual-level heterogeneity of treatment effects.45 Instead, we use the data to construct a
province-level measure of religiosity. To do so, we split the sample according to the share of
43The 95% confidence intervals for the ratio between the coefficient of the non-religious moral incentive
and the implicit moral incentive to the effect of the religious moral message are [0.109; 1.400] and [0.111;
1.435], respectively.
44None of the customers in this sample had previously received any of the moral incentive text messages.
45This survey was administered to 2,841 customers. Among them 2,274 participants of our experiment
and 567 randomly selected customers of the bank that did not participate in the experiment.
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respondents who identified as very religious in each province and compare treatment effects
for customers in locations classified as more or less religious according to this measure.46
For provinces below the median in terms of religiosity, receiving some version of the moral
message reduced delinquency by 4.6 percentage points (p-value=0.001). For provinces in
the top half in terms of religiosity, receiving the moral message lowered the likelihood of
becoming delinquent by an additional 1.1 percentage point, but the effect is not significantly
higher than in less religious provinces. The p-value of the interaction between the moral
message and a dummy for local religiosity above the median is 0.596. Taken together, these
findings indicate that our main effects are driven by the response to the moral appeal rather
than the religious nature of the message, although it is of course possible that the religious
context of our experiment enhances the responsiveness of clients to these moral appeals.
2. Provision of New Information? The Impact of Repeated Messages
We next explore whether the moral message only works the first time it is sent—for example,
because it conveys new information —or if it continues to work when the message is sent to
customers who have received it before. To address this question, we conducted a follow-up
experiment with a sample of customers who had already received the moral message once and
re-appeared on the list of late payers. In February and April 2016, customers in this group
were sent either the same version of the moral message that they had previously received for
a second time, with a lag of two months or approximately one year, or were assigned to a
control group that received no additional message.
Table ?? reports the results, pooling across the different versions of the moral message.
We find suggestive evidence that repeated moral messages still affect repayment, and that
the size of the effect is not lower among customers who receive the moral message for a second
46We identify customers as very religious if they answered “extremely important” to survey questions
that asked them about the importance of religion and the rules of Islamic law in their life, and if they ranked
religion as the most important aspect of their life among all choices given.
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time. In the specification without individual covariates and month fixed effects, reported
in Table ??, column (1), the effect of the repeated moral message is 4.1 percentage points
(p-value=0.175, Fisher exact p-value=0.163).47 We then compare the effects of the first and
the second moral messages. In order to do so, we pool the sample from the repeated message
experiment with the data from the main experiment. This requires some caution, since there
are likely to be selection issues. In particular, customers who show up on the list of late
payers for a second time are likely to differ from those who appear on the list for the first time.
Indeed, we find that while the two samples are well balanced on demographics, customers
in the repeated message sample have lower income and credit limits, and are more likely to
have been delinquent at least once in the previous year.48 We therefore include individual
covariates to address this potential selection problem.49 The results are reported in Table
??, column (4). The point estimate of receiving the moral message for the first time is 4.5
percentage points. With a point estimate of 4.3 percentage points, the effect of receiving
the moral message for a second time is nearly identical, and both effects are statistically
significant (at the 1% and 10% level, respectively). The p-value of a test of equality of
the two effects is 0.955, and the 95% confidence interval of the ratio between the effect of
receiving the message for the second time and the effect of receiving the message for the first
47There is suggestive evidence that the effects do not vary depending on the time lag between the first
and the repeated message. Sending the moral message to customers who received the same message one
year earlier increases repayment by 4.0 percentage points compared to sending no message (p-value=0.323).
Sending a moral message to customers who received the same message two months before increases repayment
by 4.4 percentage points compared to sending no message (p-value=0.346). However, the sample sizes are
too small to estimate effects separately by time since the first message.
48See online appendix Table A.6 for details.
49Another possible concern is the presence of differential selection due to the treatment. However, we
do not find any evidence of this type of selection: the proportion of customers showing up on the list of
late payers a second time in 2016 after having appeared in the sample of our main experiment in 2015 is
0.237 among those receiving a moral message and 0.239 among controls (p-value of the difference 0.865). So,
the fact of being late again after a few months from our intervention is likely due to some negative shock
independent of treatment status (possibly a negative income or liquidity shock, which is in line with these
customers having lower income, credit limit and being more likely to have been more than 30 days past due
in the past).
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time is [-0.156; 2.092].50
The result that the moral message affects repayment even when it is sent repeatedly
rules out the possibility that the message affects repayment by conveying new information.
In addition, the finding that even a moral message with no reference to religion affects
repayments indicates that the effect is not driven by the recipient learning about a religious
teaching that they were not previously aware of. Similarly, the effect cannot be explained
by the customer learning that non-repayment of debts can be considered immoral. In both
cases, the message would affect repayment only when this information is conveyed for the
first time. While we cannot test for this mechanism directly, our results are consistent with
the interpretation that customers care about the morality of repaying their debt and that the
moral message temporarily draws attention to the moral aspect of the repayment decision.
B. Additional Results and Extensions
1. Impact on Credit Card Default
In this section, we examine the effect of the moral message on default, defined as failing to
make a payment within 90 days from the due date. Since the financial product we consider
is a revolving line of credit, customers face strong repayment incentives. It is therefore not
surprising that outright default is a rare event, and much less common than delinquency:
in our sample of late-payers, only 5% of customers eventually end up defaulting on their
credit card debt.51 Table ??, columns (7) and (8) show that the moral incentive message
does not reduce this already very low default rate when we consider the entire population
50Intuitively, this exercise compares the effect size of a message sent to customers who have never seen the
message before and are late for a first time, to the effect size in the selected sample of customers who have
seen the message before and are late for a second time. While both estimates can be interpreted causally, we
cannot causally evaluate the effect of repeated messages on the non-selected sample since no further messages
are sent to customers who are not late a second time.
51In the overall population of credit card customers, default rates are below 0.5%. Information about
default is available only for customers in the first three waves of our experiment.
35
of experimental participants. However, there is substantial variation in the ex-ante credit
risk of customers in this sample, and we find that the moral message is extremely effective
at reducing default among the customers with the highest ex-ante credit risk. To calculate
a customer’s ex-ante credit risk, we estimate a linear model of default probabilities for
customers in the control group. More specifically, we run a linear regression of a dummy
variable for whether a customer defaulted on month fixed effects and a set of individual-level
covariates. We then use the model to predict the credit risk for each customer and split the
sample into groups according to the predicted probability of default. Columns (9) and (10)
of Table ?? restrict the sample to the 10% of customers with the highest predicted credit
risk.52 In column (9) we look at raw default rates and find that the moral incentive message
decreases the probability of default by 10.5 percentage points from a baseline default rate
of 13% (Fisher exact p-value=0.008). Reputational incentives are also effective in reducing
default among high risk customers: informing customers about the credit registry decreases
the probability of default by 7.7 percentage points (Fisher exact p-value=0.003). The results
remain similar in column (10), where we add month fixed effects and covariates.53
52Note that this sample split was decided upon ex-post, rather than as part of the original research design.
To corroborate our findings, we provide results for alternative credit risk thresholds in the online appendix.
53We find that moral and reputational incentives also decreases delinquency by 13.7 and and 18.6 per-
centage points, respectively, in this high-risk group (see columns (3) and (4) of Table ??): this implies
that the messages reduce default by increasing immediate repayment by the end of grace period, that is,
during the time period when we have full experimental control, and not by changing behavior later, when
the treatments could potentially interact with external factors. Table ?? reports additional results on both
delinquency and default across all treatments available, including for customers with low credit risk. In on-
line appendix Table A.7, we report results for different credit risk cutoffs and show that the moral message
leads to economically meaningful and statistically significant reductions for various alternative sub-samples
of customers with above-median credit risk. When we expand the sample to the 25% of customers with the
highest ex-ante credit risk, we find that the moral message reduces default by 4.3 peccentage points (from a
baseline default rate of 11%). In the sample of customers with above-median ex-ante credit risk, we still find
a marginally significant reduction in defaults of 2.2 percentage points (from a baseline default rate of 8%).
To further verify these results, we also predict the ex-ante credit risk of customers in our sample using two
different machine learning algorithms. The results of these exercises are reported in Table A.8 and Table
A.9 in the online appendix.
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2. Impact on the Intensive Margin of Repayment
We can further unpack the mechanism through which moral incentives affect behavior by
examining the intensive margin of repayment, that is, the amount repaid conditional on
making the minimum payment. Since each of our treatments may induce a different subset
of consumers to repay, looking at the intensive margin of repayment in isolation induces
selection problems. Specifically, because customers with a lower average willingness to repay
might make a payment if they were included in one of the moral incentive treatment groups,
a simple comparison between treatment and control groups would most likely understate the
intensive margin effect.
To avoid this selection problem, we impute zeros for all customers who did not make a
payment and analyze the combined effect of our treatments on the intensive and extensive
margin. These are unconditional means, and therefore not subject to selection. Following
this approach, we find that the average amount repaid in the control group is Rp 637,819.
The average repayment in the moral incentive group is slightly higher than in the reputational
incentive group at Rp 745,352 versus Rp 713,437 (p-value=0.654).54 Moreover, the share of
customers that repay substantially more (more than twice) the amount required to avoid
being reported to the credit registry is significantly higher in the moral incentive group than
in the reputational incentive group (23% versus 19%, p-value=0.096). This result suggests
that customers in the reputational incentive treatment act more strategically in response
to the message, and are more likely to repay only the required 10% of their outstanding
balance. In contrast, customers receiving the moral message tend to repay more than the
amount needed to avoid being reported to the credit registry.
54For these comparisons, we restrict the sample to customers late in February, March and May 2015
since there are the only months when the reputational incentive message was sent. If we consider the whole
sample, the average amount repaid in the control group is Rp 615,835 and in the moral incentive group is
Rp 725,169.
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3. Impact on Savings Account Balances
To better understand how customers make payments in response to the experimental treat-
ments, we also examine the effect of repayment on savings account balances. For this purpose,
we obtained detailed data on savings account balances for participants of our experiment
from our partner bank. We have access to customers’ daily balances on their tabungan (In-
donesian for “savings”) accounts. These are the most common types of deposit accounts
among clients of our partner bank, and have all characteristics of a standard liquid savings
account. Since credit credit card customers are not required to also have another account
with the bank, savings account balances are available for only 13% of customers in our
sample, which may give rise to selection issues.
We find that making the minimum payment increases the likelihood of a savings account
balance reduction, suggesting that customers are using their savings account balances to
repay more expensive credit card debt. Among those who made the minimum payment in
response to receiving one of our messages, 22% saw a reduction in their savings account
balance between the sixteenth and eighteenth day of the month. Among those who did not
repay, only 8% saw a reduction of their savings account balance over the same time period.
The difference is significant at the 1 percent level (p-value < 0.001). However, we do not
have sufficient statistical power to detect differences in savings balances across the different
treatment arms of our intervention, so that we consider this evidence as merely suggestive.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence that non-pecuniary moral incentives affect debt repay-
ment. In our setting, moral appeals are more effective than substantial monetary incentives
as a means to encourage debt repayment at different time horizons. We find that the impact
of our intervention on behavior is driven by responses to a moral appeal, rather than its
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religious connotation, and use a number of placebo treatments to rule out competing ex-
planations, such as reminder effects, novelty of the message, priming religion, signaling the
lender’s commitment to debt collection, and the provision of new information.
An important feature of our experiment is that we are able to shed light on private
individual motivations, as opposed to social image concerns, as drivers of moral behavior.
While it is of course difficult to fully rule out the presence of social factors in the repayment
decision, we provide evidence that individuals respond strongly to messages directed at their
sense of morality, even in a setting where a moral appeal is made in private, so that peer
effects and threats of social shaming that are present in many similar environments (see,
for example, ??) are largely absent. We show that it is possible to activate this individual
sense of morality in economic transactions without threats of punishment, or references to
the negative consequences of non-repayment, and that this has economically large effects on
debt repayment. In addition, we show that the effect of moral appeals in our experiment is
not reliant on an explicit association with religion or another moral authority: we find that
moral appeals are effective even when any religious connotation is removed and the message
simply states that non-repayment of debts violates a moral norm.
While our experiment is set in the context of Islamic banking to obtain an environment
where moral appeals are natural and credible, we believe we can derive more general lessons
from our findings. Indonesia is a large emerging market economy, in which the product we
study is marketed to a relatively secular customer population and widely used across many
segments of society. This is reflected in the characteristics of our sample: a customer survey
indicates that more than half of the customers at our partner bank have at least one other
credit card from a non-Islamic bank, the vast majority of respondents were not aware of
the religious origin of the quote used in our messages, and the share of non-Muslims in our
sample is very similar to that in the Indonesian population. Moreover, we show that moral
appeals are also effective in less religious regions, and that their effect does not rely on an
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explicit reference to religion. When we restrict the sample to customers in Jakarta, who
are much less likely to consider themselves religious, we find effects of a magnitude similar
to the rest of the sample. We also test the responsiveness of customers in our sample to
monetary incentives using the credit reputation message, and find that the magnitude of
their response to this type of incentive is very much in line with findings from credit card
customers in other emerging economies (see ?).
Overall, our findings are consistent with the interpretation that people experience a
utility cost from consciously violating a moral norm, even if the act of non-compliance is not
observable to others. While this perceived cost may be higher among religious respondents,
our results suggest that moral considerations in economic transactions are a more general
phenomenon that is likely to extrapolate to populations outside our setting. This provides
a partial rationale for the widespread commercial use of moral appeals that highlight a
moral norm but make no reference to the negative consequences of non-compliance in many
non-religious settings, such as energy conservation, recycling, and loan repayment.
The presence of moral considerations in economic transactions also has important im-
plications for market efficiency, as we show in the online appendix.55 Introducing a moral
disutility from not repaying one’s debt into models of credit provision with adverse selection
alleviates the lemons problem, since borrowers with a low ability to repay are more likely to
experience a disutility from non-repayment. Moral considerations may additionally alleviate
moral hazard in credit markets by making debtors less willing to default. In fact, a theoreti-
cal literature on general equilibrium models of default assumes that individuals experience a
disutility from default to obtain the existence of a competitive equilibrium with trade (see,
for example, ?). In these models, efficiency is typically the highest for intermediate costs of
debt non-repayment.
55In other contexts, moral considerations can determine the actual existence of markets which transactions
are considered repugnant even if the parties directly involved benefit from that trade (see ?).
40
The relative importance of monetary and non-monetary considerations in economic deci-
sions is of course context-dependent. Studying how moral incentives operate in other settings
is therefore an important avenue for future research.
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TABLE 1
Balance and Treatment Cell Size
Treatment
Full Moral Simple Religious Credit Control p-value
sample incentive reminder placebo reputation group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A1. Waves I, II, and III—Balance of Covariates
Age 42.03 42.36 42.10 41.73 41.99 42.03 0.631
[9.071] [9.317] [8.776] [8.717] [9.092] [9.195]
Female 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.914
[0.489] [0.490] [0.491] [0.491] [0.488] [0.489]
Muslim 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.427
[0.273] [0.271] [0.286] [0.289] [0.271] [0.264]
Annual income 151.67 135.51 185.73 134.86 177.65 132.85 0.418
(Rp million) [836.968] [175.295] [1242.218] [187.644] [1369.992] [201.640]
Credit limit 13.55 13.93 13.28 13.77 13.38 13.55 0.438
(Rp million) [9.338] [9.708] [8.652] [9.444] [9.272] [9.448]
A2. Waves I, II, and III—Treatment Cell Size
Wave I 2,871 400 400 400 800 871
Wave II 2,985 400 400 400 800 985
Wave III 1,965 200 200 200 400 965
Total 7,821 1,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 2,821
Treatment
Full Moral incentive Cash Control p-value
sample [religious] [implicit] [non-
religious]
rebate group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
B1. Wave IV—Balance of Covariates
Age 42.24 41.82 42.70 41.98 42.31 42.38 0.764
[9.491] [9.170] [9.415] [9.137] [9.196] [10.477]
Female 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.703
[0.488] [0.494] [0.486] [0.487] [0.482] [0.490]
Muslim 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.517
[0.271] [0.253] [0.281] [0.302] [0.253] [0.265]
Annual income 134.64 121.99 132.46 138.35 152.25 128.27 0.345
(Rp million) [189.589] [154.065] [187.183] [192.350] [233.037] [172.253]
Credit limit 13.56 13.15 13.13 14.20 13.87 13.44 0.569
(Rp million) [9.834] [10.587] [9.525] [10.587] [9.867] [9.803]
B2. Wave IV—Treatment Cell Size
Wave IV 1,687 336 336 336 336 343
Total 1,687 336 336 336 336 343
Treatment
Full Moral incentive Simple Control p-value
sample [religious] [implicit] [non-
religious]
reminder group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C1. Wave V and VI—Balance of Covariates
Age 41.61 41.73 41.80 41.36 40.95 41.79 0.557
[9.722] [10.093] [9.481] [9.639] [9.954] [9.562]
Female 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.36 0.087
[0.488] [0.492] [0.483] [0.489] [0.496] [0.481]
Muslim 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.087
[0.306] [0.326] [0.295] [0.279] [0.321] [0.314]
Annual income 158.51 141.85 205.76 159.15 160.08 131.45 0.379
(Rp million) [966.064] [219.339] [1942.643] [556.385] [609.755] [184.891]
Credit limit 13.87 13.68 14.00 13.73 13.59 14.17 0.786
(Rp million) [10.257] [10.037] [10.530] [10.143] [9.967] [10.441]
C2. Wave V and VI—Treatment Cell Size
Wave V 2,106 546 482 488 0 590
Wave VI 1,814 362 362 362 362 366
Total 3,920 908 844 850 362 956
Note.—Panel A1 reports summary statistics for the sample and presents a test of random assignment
for waves I, II, and III. Column (1) reports the mean level of each variable, with standard deviations in
brackets, for the full sample. Columns (2) to (6) report the mean level of each variable, with standard
deviations in brackets, for all experimental treatment conditions. Column (7) reports the p-value of a
test for equality of means in all experimental conditions. Panel A2 reports treatment cell sizes by month.
Panels B1 and B2, and C1 and C2 report the same statistics for waves IV, and waves V and VI, respectively.
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TABLE 2
Treatment Effects: Moral Incentives
Dummy for delinquency
(1) (2) (3)
Moral incentive -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.051***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Delinquency rate control group 0.66
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Sample Full sample Full sample Full sample
Observations 6,364 13,428 13,428
R2 0.002 0.011 0.057
Note.—Column (1) restricts the sample to customers assigned to the moral
incentive or control groups. Columns (2) and (3) use the entire sample.
Column (1) reports results from an OLS regression of a delinquency dummy
on treatment indicators. The omitted category is the control group, for
which we report the mean delinquency rate. Column (2) adds month fixed
effects. Column (3) adds individual covariates (age, gender dummy, Muslim
dummy, province dummy, income, a dummy for having been in the sample
in a previous month, and a dummy for having been delinquent at least once
in the previous 12 months). Robust standard errors in brackets.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE 3
Benchmarking Moral Incentives: Cash Rebate
Dummy for delinquency
(1) (2) (3)
Moral incentive -0.054 -0.052*** -0.051***
[0.036] [0.013] [0.013]
Cash rebate -0.021 -0.014 -0.003
[0.035] [0.030] [0.029]
Delinquency rate control group 0.70 0.66
Moral incentive - -0.033 -0.038 -0.047
Cash rebate [0.036] [0.030] [0.029]
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Sample Only wave IV Full sample Full sample
Observations 1,015 13,428 13,428
R2 0.002 0.011 0.057
Note.—Column (1) restricts the sample to customers late in June 2015 and
assigned to either the moral incentive, financial incentive (run only in wave
IV), or control groups. Columns (2) and (3) use the entire sample. Column (1)
reports results from an OLS regression of a delinquency dummy on treatment
indicators. The omitted category is the control group, for which we report
the mean delinquency rate. Column (2) adds month fixed effects. Column
(3) adds individual covariates (age, gender dummy, Muslim dummy, province
dummy, income, a dummy for having been in the sample in a previous month,
and a dummy for having been delinquent at least once in the previous 12
months). “Moral incentive - cash rebate” is the difference between the “moral
incentive” and “cash rebate” coefficients. Robust standard errors in brackets.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
TABLE 4
Benchmarking Moral Incentives: Credit Reputation
Dummy for delinquency
(1) (2) (3)
Moral incentive -0.060*** -0.052*** -0.051***
[0.018] [0.013] [0.013]
Credit reputation -0.098*** -0.102*** -0.104***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013]
Delinquency rate control group 0.66
Moral incentive - 0.038** 0.051** 0.053***
Credit reputation [0.019] [0.016] [0.016]
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Sample Waves I, II, and III Full sample Full sample
Observations 5,821 13,428 13,428
R2 0.008 0.011 0.057
Note.—Column (1) restricts the sample to customers late in February, March or
May 2015 and assigned to either the moral incentive, reputational incentive (this
treatment was not run in waves IV, V and VI), or control group. Columns (2)
and (3) use the whole sample. Column (1) reports results from an OLS regression
of a delinquency dummy on treatment indicators. The omitted category is the
control group, for which we report the mean delinquency rate. Column (2) adds
month fixed effects. Column (3) adds individual covariates (age, gender dummy,
Muslim dummy, province dummy, income, a dummy for having been in the sample
in a previous month, and a dummy for having been delinquent at least once in the
previous 12 months). “Moral incentive - credit reputation” is the difference between
the “moral incentive” and “credit reputation” coefficients. Robust standard errors
in brackets.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE 5
Ruling Out Other Channels
Dummy for delinquency
(1) (2) (3)
Moral incentive -0.060*** -0.052*** -0.051***
[0.018] [0.013] [0.013]
Simple reminder -0.006 -0.023 -0.022
[0.018] [0.015] [0.015]
Religious placebo -0.002 -0.006 -0.010
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
Delinquency rate control group 0.66
Moral incentive - -0.054** -0.029* -0.028*
Simple reminder [0.022] [0.017] [0.017]
Moral incentive - -0.058*** -0.045** -0.041**
Religious placebo [0.022] [0.019] [0.019]
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Sample Waves I, II, and III Full sample Full sample
Observations 5,821 13,428 13,428
R2 0.002 0.011 0.057
Note.—Column (1) excludes customers late in June 2015, February 2016 and April
2016, and restricts the sample to customers assigned to the moral incentive, simple
repayment reminder, religious placebo (not run simultaneously in waves IV, V and
VI), or control groups. Columns (2) and (3) use the entire sample. Column (1)
reports results from an OLS regression of a delinquency dummy on treatment in-
dicators. The omitted category is the control group, for which we report the mean
delinquency rate. Column (2) adds month fixed effects. Column (3) adds indi-
vidual covariates (age, gender dummy, Muslim dummy, province dummy, income,
a dummy for having been in the sample in a previous month, and a dummy for
having been delinquent at least once in the previous 12 months). “Moral incentive
- simple reminder” is the difference between the “moral incentive” and “simple re-
minder” coefficients. “Moral incentive - religious placebo” is the difference between
the “moral incentive” and “religious placebo” coefficients. Robust standard errors
in brackets.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE 6
What Drives the Moral Appeal? Religious Connotation
Dummy for delinquency
(1) (2) (3)
Moral incentive -0.041** -0.051*** -0.051***
[0.019] [0.013] [0.013]
Implicit moral incentive -0.039** -0.041** -0.039**
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018]
Non-religious moral incentive -0.039** -0.040** -0.038**
[0.019] [0.018] [0.017]
Delinquency rate control group 0.68 0.66
Moral incentive - -0.001 -0.011 -0.011
Implicit moral incentive [0.019] [0.018] [0.018]
Moral incentive - -0.002 -0.011 -0.012
Non-religious moral incentive [0.020] [0.018] [0.018]
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Sample Waves IV, V, and VI Full sample Full sample
Observations 4,909 13,428 13,428
R2 0.001 0.011 0.057
Note.—Column (1) restricts the sample to customers late in June 2015, February
2016 or April 2016 and assigned to the moral incentive, implicit moral incentive, non-
religious moral incentive (the last two treatments were run only in Wave IV, V, and
VI), or control groups. Columns (2) and (3) use the whole sample. Column (1) reports
results from an OLS regression of a delinquency dummy on treatment indicators. The
omitted category is the control group, for which we report the mean delinquency rate.
Column (2) adds month fixed effects. Column (3) adds individual covariates (age,
gender dummy, Muslim dummy, province dummy, income, a dummy for having been
in the sample in a previous month, and a dummy for having been delinquent at least
once in the previous 12 months). “Moral incentive - implicit moral incentive” is the
difference between the “moral incentive” and “implicit moral incentive” coefficients.
“Moral incentive - non-religious moral incentive” is the difference between the “moral
incentive” and “non-religious moral incentive” coefficients. Robust standard errors in
brackets.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE 7
What Drives the Moral Appeal? Repeated Moral Messages
Dummy for delinquency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Repeated moral incentive -0.041 -0.041 -0.036 -0.043*
[0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.025]
First moral incentive -0.045***
[0.011]
Delinquency rate control group 0.72 0.67
Repeated moral incentive - 0.001
First moral incentive [0.026]
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample Waves V and VI Full sample
Observations 898 898 898 14,326
R2 0.002 0.006 0.071 0.056
Note.—Columns (1)-(3) restrict the sample to customers that were part
of the follow-up experiment. These customers had been late in February
2016 or April 2016 and had received a moral message in a previous wave
of the experiment. Column (4) uses the entire sample, consisting of the
main and follow-up experiments. Column (1) reports results from an OLS
regression of a delinquency dummy on treatment indicators. The omitted
category is the control group, for which we report the mean delinquency
rate. Column (2) adds month fixed effects. Column (3) adds individual
covariates (age, gender dummy, Muslim dummy, province dummy, income,
a dummy for having been in the sample in a previous month, and a dummy
for having been delinquent at least once in the previous 12 months). Col-
umn (4) adds a dummy for having received one of the three versions of
the moral message for the first time, and additional treatment group dum-
mies. “Repeated moral incentive - first moral incentive” is the difference
between the “repeated moral incentive” and “first moral incentive” coeffi-
cients. Robust standard errors in brackets.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE 8
Effects on Credit Card Default
Dummy for delinquency Dummy for default
Full sample High credit risk Low credit risk Full sample High credit risk Low credit risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Moral incentive -0.080∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.003 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ 0.008 0.008
[0.020] [0.020] [0.061] [0.061] [0.022] [0.021] [0.008] [0.008] [0.027] [0.029] [0.009] [0.009]
Credit reputation -0.118∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.077∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.006 0.006
[0.017] [0.017] [0.052] [0.052] [0.018] [0.018] [0.007] [0.007] [0.028] [0.029] [0.007] [0.007]
Simple reminder -0.026 -0.034∗ -0.081 -0.082 -0.020 -0.029 0.010 0.011 -0.011 -0.017 0.013 0.013
[0.020] [0.020] [0.061] [0.060] [0.021] [0.021] [0.009] [0.009] [0.040] [0.041] [0.009] [0.009]
Religious placebo -0.022 -0.032 -0.010 -0.019 -0.025 -0.035∗ 0.013 0.013 0.005 -0.003 0.013 0.013
[0.020] [0.020] [0.057] [0.055] [0.021] [0.021] [0.009] [0.009] [0.040] [0.042] [0.009] [0.009]
Delinquency rate control group 0.68 0.74 0.67
Default rate control group 0.05 0.13 0.05
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample Waves I, II, and III
Observations 6,979 717 6,262 6,979 717 6,262
R2 0.010 0.080 0.028 0.121 0.009 0.078 0.001 0.016 0.021 0.057 0.001 0.014
Note.—Columns (1)-(2) and (7)-(8) restrict the sample to customers late in February, March, and May 2015, which is the sample of customers for
whom information on default is available. Using customers in the control group, we estimate the probability of default based on an OLS estimation
that regresses a dummy for credit card default on month fixed effects and individual covariates (age, gender dummy, Muslim dummy, province dummy,
income, a dummy for having been in the sample in a previous month, and a dummy for having been delinquent at least once in the previous 12 months).
We use this model to predict the probability of default for each customer, and split the sample in two groups: the 10% of customers with the highest
predicted probability of default (“high credit risk”), and the remaining 90% of customers (“low credit risk”). Columns (3)-(4) and (9)-(10) restrict the
sample to high credit risk customers, while columns (5)-(6) and (11)-(12) restrict the sample to low credit risk customers. Columns (1), (3), and (5)
report results from OLS regressions of a delinquency dummy on treatment indicators. Columns (2), (4), and (6) add month fixed effects and individual
covariates. Columns (7), (9), and (11) report results from OLS regressions of a dummy for credit card default on treatment group indicators. Columns
(8), (10), and (12) add month fixed effects and individual covariates. The omitted category in all regressions is the control group, for which we report
mean delinquency and default rates. Robust standard errors in brackets.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Fig. 1 .—The figure shows the credit card billing cycle and timing of the intervention.
Customers receive their monthly statement on the eigthteenth day of each month. The due
date is on the eighth day of the following month. One day later, the bank sends a simple
reminder message to all late-paying customers. The repayment deadline is on the eighteenth
day of the following month, at the end of a ten-day grace period. On the sixteenth day of
the month (two days before the repayment deadline), randomly assigned messages are sent
to customers assigned to one of the treatment groups. Repayment status is observed at the
time of the final repayment deadline, which is midnight on the eighteenth day of the following
month (one month after the billing date).
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